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Abstract 
In this paper, we describe a program of research on the topic of ridicule, which explored 
the differing effects of observing either ridicule directed at other people or self-
disparaging ridicule. In three studies, participants listened to humor that either ridiculed 
another person, ridiculed the self (the person expressing the humor), or involved no 
ridicule. Results in two studies showed that observing ridicule that targeted another 
person led participants to conform more to the alleged attitudes of others and to 
behave in ways suggesting a heightened fear of failure, compared to self-ridicule or no 
ridicule. In contrast, results in a third study showed that observing self-disparaging ridicule 
led participants to generate more creative ideas, compared to other-ridicule or no 
ridicule. The implications of these “inhibiting” effects of other-ridicule and “disinhibiting” 
effects of self-ridicule are discussed. 
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Ridicule is defined as “the act of making someone the object of scornful laughter” 
(Webster‟s New World Dictionary, 2002). This type of humor is common in modern-
day society. I t is a staple in late-night comedy shows, political campaigns, 
advertising, and even prime time telev ision. Stocking, Sopolsky, and Zillmann (1977) 
did a content analysis of humor in prime time telev ision for one week. An incident of 
humor was recorded as “hostile” if a person or thing was disparaged. They found 
that 69% of all humorous incidents in prime time were hostile.  
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Of course, ridicule is not a modern phenomenon—indeed, it has been around for 
millennia. In an examination of the humor in the Old Testament, Koestler (1964) found 
that most of the references to humor or laughter were linked with scorn, derision, 
mockery, or contempt. Only 2 of the 29 humor references in the Old Testament were 
categorized as “good-natured.” More recently, Gruner (1978) has argued that 
“ridicule is the basic component of all humorous material” (p. 14). 
 
Ridicule is one form of disparagement humor, a broader category that has been 
defined as humorous material in which one party is v ictimized, belittled, humiliated, 
or suffers some misfortune or act of aggression (Zillmann, 1983). Most disparagement 
humor targets groups or members of groups (e.g., women, ethnic groups, lawyers) 
rather than indiv iduals. Ridicule can be distinguished from disparagement humor in 
that it tends to be more personal in nature and is typically directed at an indiv idual 
rather than a group (Wilson, 1979). 
 
In this paper, we describe a program of research we have conducted on the topic 
of ridicule, exploring the differing effects of ridicule directed at other people versus 
the self. We begin by rev iewing some past theories and empirical studies by other 
researchers on disparagement humor, which have identified important 
consequences of such humor on listeners‟ attitudes and stereotypes. We then turn to 
our own research. 
 
Theories of Disparagement Humor 
 
Several theoretical models have been proposed to explain the prevalence and 
consequences of disparagement humor (and, by implication, ridicule). We briefly 
rev iew four of these models in the following sections (for more detailed rev iews, see 
Ferguson & Ford, 2008; Martin, 2007). 
 
Psychoanalytic Theory 
 
Freud (1905/1960) theorized that we enjoy disparagement humor because the 
comedic façade disguises the hostility of the content. Thus, we can vent our 
aggressive feelings in a socially acceptable manner. From this perspective, 
disparagement humor “provides the humorist with a relatively benign means of 
expressing and satisfying unconscious, socially unacceptable impulses” (Ferguson & 
Ford, 2008, p. 285). Furthermore, according to Freud, expressing these aggressive 
impulses through humor has a cathartic effect—a reduction of hostile psychic 
energy.  
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In empirical tests, however, the catharsis hypothesis has received little support. In 
fact, researchers have typically found that exposure to hostile humor actually 
increases expressions of aggression (e.g., Baron, 1978; Ryan & Kanjorski, 1998). In 
Baron‟s study, for example, male college students were exposed to non-humorous 
materials, hostile humor, or non-hostile humor. The students were then given an 
opportunity to aggress against a male confederate.  Results of the study indicated 
that students in the hostile humor condition aggressed more than did those in the 
non-humor condition, whereas those students in the non-hostile humor condition 
aggressed less than those in the non-humor condition (Baron, 1978). I t is true that 
people sometimes enjoy humor that disparages others, but there is little ev idence 
that such v icarious hostility reduces our aggressive urges. 
 
Superiority Theory 
 
Superiority theory dates back to the earliest Greek philosophers. Both Plato and 
Aristotle posited that people find the weaknesses of others humorous, and that 
“laughter is an expression of derision or malice directed at the less fortunate” 
(Ferguson & Ford, 2008, p. 288). 
 
Many centuries later, Thomas Hobbes, who is often considered the “father” of 
modern humor theory, hypothesized that amusement and laughter are the result of 
the glory we feel when we favorably compare ourselves with less fortunate others 
(Hobbes, 1651/1968). Hobbes noted “I t is no wonder therefore that men take 
heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is, triumphed over” (Hobbes, 1681/1968).  
 
Charles Gruner (1997) is a modern advocate of the superiority theory of humor. He 
proposes that all humor, no matter how seemingly innocuous, contains hostility and 
aggression. This perspective would seem at odds with the existence of humor that 
appears nonaggressive. For example, puns and limericks often use clever wordplay 
to amuse. Or humor can be used to poke fun at oneself, or to comment on the 
absurdities of life. Yet Gruner maintains that aggression toward others and triumphing 
over them is an essential aspect of humor, at least implicitly: “Successful 
humor…must include winning” (1997, p. 9). 
 
The concept of shadenfreude (delight in the misery of others) captures the essence 
of this superiority dynamic— it sometimes makes us feel good to see other people fail.  
Ridicule simply adds a dose of humor to the mix, thus making our shadenfreude 
more socially acceptable. A humorous communication implies that its message is to 
be interpreted in a non-serious manner. Thus, “disparagement humor can uniquely 
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denigrate its target while stifling challenge or criticism” (Ferguson & Ford, 2008, p. 
284). One theme of our own research, described later in this article, is that 
shadenfreude can be a double-edged sword, so to speak: when we revel in the 
misery of others, we may also become more acutely aware that others may similarly 
revel in our misery. 
 
Disposition Theory 
 
A more recent version of superiority theory, disposition theory, echoes the basic 
premise that we are entertained by the misfortunes of others, but also stipulates that 
our relationship to the target of the humor affects the degree of our enjoyment of 
the humor. Specifically, we are more entertained by the disparagement of targets 
we dislike or members of an out-group, as opposed to targets we like or members of 
our in-group (e.g., La Fave, 1972; Wicker, Baron, & Willis, 1980). For example, in an 
early experiment on humor, Wolff, Smith, and Murray (1934) presented anti -Jewish 
jokes to both Jewish and non-Jewish participants. Perhaps not surprisingly, they 
found that the non-Jewish participants enjoyed the jokes more than the Jewish 
participants.  
 
Zillmann and Cantor (1976) emphasized the importance of an indiv idual‟s attitudes 
toward the target group, rather than merely in-group vs. out-group status, in 
determining one‟s appreciation for humor that targets an out-group. For example, 
Thomas and Esses (2004) found that men who were high in hostile sexism reported 
more enjoyment of jokes that disparaged females compared to men who were low 
on this dimension.   
 
As noted earlier, one way in which ridicule can be distinguished from disparagement 
humor is that the former is more personal in nature and is usually directed at an 
indiv idual rather than a group (Wilson, 1979). For example, ridicule often consists of  
derisive joking about some aspect of an indiv idual‟s behavior or appearance. An 
interesting study that examined personal attitudes toward a particular indiv idual was 
conducted by Zillmann and Bryant (1980). In this study, participants were treated 
either rudely or politely by a female experimenter. Participants then witnessed her in 
one of three conditions:  she spilled a cup of hot tea on herself; she spilled tea on 
herself when a jack-in-the-box suddenly popped out of a box; or a jack-in-the-box 
popped up, but she did not spill her tea. Results of the study indicated that humor 
cues (smiling and laughing) were highest in the condition in which the participants 
had been treated rudely by the experimenter and the tea was spilled in response to 
the jack-in-the-box. I t appeared, therefore, that observ ing a disliked target have a 
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mishap was not sufficient for the experience of mirth: some humorous cues were also 
necessary. 
 
Social Identity Theory 
 
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) is a broad perspective built 
on the assumption that people‟s group memberships constitute an important part of 
their identity. Whereas traditional models of identity focus on indiv iduals‟ personal 
qualities and accomplishments (Baumeister, 1998), social identity theory emphasizes 
indiv iduals‟ social relationships and group memberships as additional sources of self-
evaluation. 
 
Social identity theory assumes that people want to maintain a positive identity, 
including a positive social identity. One way to achieve a positive social identity is by 
judging one‟s own groups to be superior to other groups. In fact, researchers have 
found that indiv iduals will try to create a positive social identity by treating members 
of in-groups more favorably than members of out-groups (e.g., Tajfel, 1970). 
 
Clearly, a motivation to perceive one‟s in-groups as superior to out-groups can be 
served by disparaging humor about those out-groups. Thus, social identity theory 
prov ides a motivational account of why people enjoy disparagement humor 
(Bourhis, R.Y., Nicholas, J.G., Howard, G., & Henri, T. 1977; Ferguson & Ford, 2008). For 
example, ev idence that members of ethnic groups find humor about other ethnic 
groups funnier than humor about their own ethnic group (e.g., La Fave, 1972; Wicker 
et al., 1980; Wolff et al., 1934) may reflect perceivers‟ desires to create or maintain a 
positive social identity. 
 
The Effects of Disparagement Humor on Attitudes and behavior 
 
Given the prevalence of disparagement humor in our culture, understanding its 
effects on listeners‟ attitudes and behavior is important. There is a common 
perception that disparagement humor can influence listeners‟ stereotypes; that is, 
hearing disparaging jokes targeting a particular group may strengthen or perhaps 
even create negative stereotypes about that group. A series of experiments by 
Olson, Maio, and Hobden (1999) tested this perception. In their studies, participants 
were exposed to disparaging humor about men or about lawyers, whereas control 
groups were exposed to non-disparaging humor, non-humorous disparagement, or 
nothing. Participants‟ attitudes towards the target groups were then assessed, as well 
as the latencies of responses to these attitude items (as an indication of the 
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accessibility, or ease of retrieval, of the attitudes). Additionally, participants were 
asked to rate the target groups on stereotypic attributes and to evaluate ambiguous  
behaviors by members of the target group. 
 
The results suggested that exposure to disparaging humor did not influence 
participants‟ attitudes toward members of the target group, nor did it elicit 
stereotypical attributions regarding the group. One important limitation of these 
studies, as the authors noted, was that the targets of the disparagement humor were 
relatively high-status indiv iduals (lawyers). Perhaps the effects of exposure to 
disparagement humor would be more pronounced with socially marginalized 
groups. 
 
A subsequent experiment asked participants to recite, as opposed to listen to, 
disparaging humor about another target group (Newfoundlanders—people liv ing in 
a Canadian province who are sometimes negatively stereotyped). Results showed 
that participants who had recited the humor expressed more negative stereotypes 
about Newfoundlanders than did those who recited non-disparaging humor (Maio, 
Olson, & Bush, 1997). The authors noted that these findings could be explained by 
either cognitive dissonance theory or self-perception theory. According to cognitive 
dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), the participants‟ negative behavior (reciting the 
disparaging jokes) may have conflicted with their actual, positive attitudes toward 
the target group, which elicited dissonance arousal and led them to alter their  
opinions to be more consistent with their negative behavior. Alternatively, according 
to self-perception theory (Bem, 1967), participants may have been unsure of their 
original attitudes toward the target group. Reciting disparaging jokes about that 
group may have led participants to infer that their attitudes were relatively negative. 
 
Prejudiced Norm Theory 
 
A relatively recent theory that has attempted to delineate more clearly the 
mechanisms through which disparagement humor can affect people‟s attitudes is 
prejudiced norm theory (Ford & Ferguson, 2004). These researchers have focused on 
whether disparaging humor targeting an out-group increases tolerance for 
discrimination toward members of those groups. According to Ford and Ferguson, 
disparaging humor makes prejudice and discrimination toward the target group 
more acceptable; it contains a “normative standard that, in this context, one need  
not consider discrimination against the targeted group in a serious or critical 
manner” (p. 83). As a result, indiv iduals who are already predisposed to feel 
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negatively toward the target group are likely to exhibit increased tolerance for 
discrimination. For example, Ford et al. (2001) found that men who scored high in  
 
hostile sexism were more likely than men low in this dimension to perceive a norm of 
tolerance to sexism upon exposure to sexist humor. Exposure to non-humorous sexist 
statements, or to non-sexist humor, did not produce this tolerance. I t appears that 
the lev ity contained in humor allows those who are predisposed to feel negatively 
about particular groups to bypass critical assessment of the derogatory information 
embedded in the humor. 
 
Ridicule as an Educational Corrective 
 
Some researchers have also examined whether ridicule may be used an 
educational corrective—to encourage positive behaviors through the ridicule of 
negative behaviors. For example, an experiment by Bryant, Brown, Parks, and 
Zillmann (1983) had young children observe muppet models being corrected for 
engaging in specific negative behaviors through either ridicule, commands, or 
suggestions. Later, the children were observed to see whether they engaged in the 
targeted negative behaviors. Interestingly, 6-year olds were more influenced by the 
ridicule than the other modes of correction, whereas 4-year olds were not. The 
authors hypothesized that “6-year olds are apparently sufficiently socialized to 
recognize and appreciate the punishing power of derisive laughter. In contrast, 4-
year olds…may lack the experience necessary to recognize derision for what it is” 
(Bryant et al., 1983, p. 252). 
 
Another study examining the use of ridicule as an educational corrective was 
conducted with university students (Bryant, Brown, & Parks, 1981). Students in a 
lecture-style course were given one of three course handouts employing different 
motivational strategies. In one condition, the handout consisted of cartoons 
ridiculing students who did not complete their course readings. Other students were 
given handouts insulting (without humor) students who did not complete the 
readings. A third group of students was assigned to a “gentle reminder” condition, 
with a message stressing the importance of completing the course readings. The 
dependent measure in this study was the performance of the students on a surprise 
quiz that tested knowledge of the course readings. Students in the ridicule condition 
performed significantly better on the quiz than did students in the other two 
conditions. 
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An interesting aspect of these results is the finding that ridicule was more effective 
than insult in motivating the students. There are at least two possible reasons why, in 
various settings, ridicule may have more impact than insult. First, ridicule makes 
retaliation (e.g., rejection of the attempted influence in the course outline) less 
appropriate for the target. Unlike insult, which can only be interpreted as aggressive, 
ridicule contains an element of lev ity or amusement. Targets might hesitate to 
engage in retaliation to ridicule because they do not want to be seen as “a poor 
sport” or “having no sense of humor.” Second, ridicule is more socially acceptable 
than insult. A person (e.g., a professor) who ridicules others (e.g., in the course 
outline) may be perceived as witty and clever, possessing a good sense of humor, 
whereas someone who insults others is more likely to be perceived as rude or boorish.  
These perceptions are likely to increase the persuasiveness and influence of the 
former indiv idual relative to the latter. 
 
Self-Deprecating Humor 
 
Self-deprecating humor occurs when an indiv idual pokes fun at him or herself.  
Whereas humor that ridicules other people has been shown to have potentially 
negative effects (e.g., greater tolerance of discrimination against the targeted 
group), it seems plausible that self-deprecating humor might have different 
consequences. For example, observ ing another person making light of her or her 
personal shortcomings may induce liking for the apparently modest speaker, which 
might prevent the attribution of negative characteristics to him or her. Indeed, by 
joking about personal weaknesses or failures, a self-deprecating model 
demonstrates a lack of concern about the social consequences of the admitted 
foibles. This lack of concern may encourage observers to perceive their own 
shortcomings as less serious or even amusing. 
 
Unfortunately, research examining self-deprecating humor is relatively scarce and 
has not directly tested the preceding speculations. An early study conducted by 
Stocking and Zillmann (1976) found that a male who disparaged himself was 
perceived by other men as having lower self-esteem, being less intelligent, and 
being less confident than a male who disparaged others. Women, on the other 
hand, reported more favourable impressions of those males who engaged in self-
ridicule.   
 
A more recent study by Lundy, Tam, and Cunningham (1998) examine d the 
combined effects of self-deprecating humor and physical attractiveness on an 
observer‟s desire for future romantic interactions. Male and female participants were 
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shown a photograph of a person of the opposite sex and a transcript of an interv iew 
with that person. The independent variables were whether the photograph was of 
an attractive or unattractive person, and whether the transcript contained self-
deprecating humor or no humor. Participants expressed their interest in several types 
of relationships with the target person (e.g., dating, marriage, intercourse). 
 
For men, the attractive female target was perceived to be more desirable than the 
unattractive female target for most types of relationships, and humor had no effects. 
For women, however, there was an interaction between attractiveness and humor. 
Self-deprecating humor increased the desirability of attractive males, but not of 
unattractive males. This increased desirability was found for both short term (e.g., 
intercourse) and long-term (e.g., marriage) relationships. Unfortunately, because this 
study did not include targets who exhibited other-deprecating ridicule, it is 
impossible to ascertain whether females‟ greater liking for attractive males who used 
self-deprecating humor was due to the self-deprecating nature of the humor or to 
the simple fact that the males exhibited a sense of humor of any kind.  
 
A study by Greengross and Miller (2008), examining the adaptive functions of humor, 
did contrast the effects of self- and other-deprecating humor. Participants listened to 
tape recordings of opposite-sex people who generated either self-deprecating or 
other-deprecating humor, and who were described as either high or low status.  
Participants were asked to rate the target‟s attractiveness as a short- and long-term 
mate.  Humor style and status had no effect on short-term attractiveness of the 
target, but both men and women rated high-status presenters who engaged in self-
deprecating humor as being more attractive as long-term mates than those who 
engaged in other-deprecating humor, No differences were found in the low -status 
condition.  These studies suggest that indiv iduals who are socially advantaged (e.g., 
high status, attractive) might be perceived as more appealing when they engage in 
self-deprecating humor, perhaps because this type of humor signals a sense of 
modesty on the part of the humorist that would bode well for long-term relationships.    
 
Humor Styles 
 
Another issue that is relevant to understanding both other-ridicule and self-
deprecating humor is the notion of preferred humor styles. The Humor Styles 
Questionnaire, developed by Martin, Puhlik-Doris, Larsen, Gray, and Weir (2003), was 
designed to assess chronic indiv idual differences in preferred types of humor. The 
authors proposed that there are four principal types of humor: aggressive, affiliative, 
self-defeating, and self-enhancing. Martin et al. hypothesized that aggressive and 
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self-defeating humor are relatively unhealthy and maladaptive, whereas affiliative 
and self-enhancing humor are more healthy and adaptive.  
 
Aggressive humor is the tendency to use humor to demean others; most ridicule 
directed at other people falls into this domain. Affiliative humor refers to the 
tendency to be humorous in order to amuse others. This type of humor represents a 
non-hostile, tolerant use of humor that enhances interpersonal relations. Whereas 
ridicule of others would generally fall into the category of aggressive humor, 
sometimes people in close relationships will lov ingly tease each other, poking fun at 
the other person‟s weaknesses. In this case, the humor is intended more for affiliative 
purposes than aggressive ones. Thus, it may be difficult at times to distinguish 
between aggressive and affiliative styles of humor.  A key distinction, however, 
between the two styles is that affiliative humor is associated with concern and care 
about others, whereas aggressive humor is characterized by “lack of personal 
regard or concern for the feelings and rights of others” (Kuiper, Grimshaw, Leite, & 
Kirsh, 2004, p.145).  
 
Self-enhancing humor refers to humor that allows the speaker to maintain a positive 
and amused perspective on life‟s trials and tribulations. Self-defeating humor, on the 
other hand, refers to the use of excessively self-disparaging humor, perhaps to 
ingratiate oneself with others. The boundaries between self-enhancing and self-
defeating humor can be blurred as well.  They are both self-focused in orientation, as 
opposed to the other-orientation of affiliative and aggressive humor (Kuiper et al.,  
2004). Although the use of self-deprecating humor might be excessive in some cases 
(and therefore qualify as self-defeating humor), at other times, it is more moderate 
and constitutes self-enhancing humor—laughing at one‟s own difficulties. For 
example, in the opening scene of An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore announces “Hello, 
my name is Al Gore, and I  used to be the next president of the United States”. The 
crowd ate it up. Although self-deprecating, this type of humor can be considered 
self-enhancing. Allport (1950) noted that “the neurotic who learns to laugh at himself 
may be on the way to self-management, perhaps to cure” (p. 180). When engaging 
in self-deprecation, we take ourselves less seriously, something that may be adaptive 
rather than self-defeating.  At times self-deprecation may actually be liberating, 
allowing us to reinterpret negative stereotypes in a positive way. In his article 
exploring Jewish self-deprecating humor, Davies noted that “ethnic jokes told from 
outside as mockery can become assertions of autonomy and v itality when told be 
the subjects themselves” (1991, p.189).  
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Thus, both other-directed and self-deprecating humor come in different varieties. 
People may poke fun at others in gentle ways that promote affiliation, or they can 
engage in more hostile other-ridicule. Similarly, people may mock themselves in 
gentle ways that remind the audience that everyone has weaknesses and foibles, or 
they can exhibit more extreme self-ridicule, perhaps in a desperate attempt to be 
liked by others.   
 
Armed with this brief rev iew of research on disparagement humor, we can now turn 
to the specific issue that has driven our own research. We have been interested in 
the effects of observing ridicule, either other-directed or self-directed, on indiv iduals‟ 
psychological states and behavioral tendencies. Our specific hypotheses concern 
the possible differential effects of other-directed versus self-directed ridicule on 
conformity, fear of failure, and creativ ity. We coined the term “jeer pressure” to 
capture the essence of the process that results from observ ing other-directed 
ridicule. 
 
Research on Jeer Pressure 
 
In our research, we have tested the hypothesis that observ ing another person being 
ridiculed has an inhibiting effect on the observer. This jeer pressure (similar to “peer 
pressure”) is assumed to spring from evaluation apprehension—a concern on the 
part of the observer that he or she might also become a target of evaluation and 
ridicule. The evaluation apprehension motivates conformity: the indiv idual will 
conform to norms and rules so as to avoid standing out. Jeer pressure was also 
expected to reduce participants‟ creativ ity, which requires divergent thinking. We 
have also tested a secondary hypothesis , which is that self-ridicule, rather than 
producing inhibition and conformity, might actually have a disinhibiting effect. We 
speculated that seeing an indiv idual make fun of him or herself might make the 
observer less concerned than usual about being negatively evaluated and, 
therefore, less conforming and more creative. 
 
Overview of Dependent Measures in Studies 
 
The dependent measures we employed in one or more of our three experiments 
were: conformity, fear of failure, and creativ ity. First, we expected that seeing 
another person being ridiculed would produce conformity in the observer, because 
he or she would want to reduce the likelihood of personally becoming a target of 
ridicule. In fact, several theorists have suggested that one of the social functions of 
ridicule is to castigate nonconformity (e.g., Martineau, 1972; Wilson, 1979). 
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Conformity was assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 by having participants rate the 
funniness of four cartoon strips, which had bogus ratings by “previous participants” 
included on the rating sheet (ostensibly to save trees by conserv ing paper). These 
“previous ratings” were designed to be erroneous: the funniest cartoons received 
the lowest bogus ratings, whereas the least funny cartoons received the highest 
bogus ratings. Conformity was defined as adhering closely to the “previous ratings”.  
 
A second dependent measure in Experiments 1 and 2 was fear of failure. We 
predicted that observ ing another person being ridiculed would increase 
participants‟ fear of failure on a subsequent task because they would be more 
anxious about being ridiculed if they failed. We assessed fear of failure v ia a ring toss 
task, in which participants tried to throw rings made of rope onto wooden pegs. 
According to early research conducted by Atkinson and Litwin (1960), people who 
are afraid of failing on this task are more likely to employ either a self-handicapping 
strategy (whereby they stand very far away from the peg to toss the rings, giv ing 
themselves a plausible explanation for failure) or a low risk strategy (whereby they 
minimize the chances of failing by standing very near to the peg to toss the rings). In 
contrast, indiv iduals who are lower in fear of failure are more likely to stand at a 
moderate distance from the peg to toss the rings; in this fashion, they are able to 
realistically challenge themselves at the ring toss task. 
 
Finally, in all three studies, we measured creativ ity, which we also expected to be 
influenced by observ ing the ridicule of others. Because creativ ity involves divergent 
thinking—thinking “outside the box”—it was assumed that observ ing others being 
ridiculed might constrain this type of thinking. The desire to avoid looking foolish 
might interfere with one‟s ability or motivation to engage in unconventional thinking. 
Thus, observers of other people being ridiculed were expected to exhibit less 
creative thinking than those who did not witness such ridicule. In contrast, observers 
of self-ridicule were expected to feel more comfortable taking risks and, therefore, to 
exhibit greater creativ ity. Creativ ity was assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 using the 
Multiple Uses Task (Torrance, 1962), in which participants are asked to generate as 
many non-traditional uses for a brick as possible. Responses are scored for both 
quantity and creativ ity (non-traditional responses). A different task was used to 
measure creativ ity in Experiment 3, which we will describe later. 
 
Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1 (Janes & Olson, 2000, Experiment 1), participants were exposed to 
one of three 8-min v ideotapes of a stand-up comedian telling jokes. In the other-
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ridicule condition, the comedian told ridiculing jokes about another person. In the 
self-ridicule condition, the comedian told the same jokes, but with himself as the 
target (e.g., “This guy I know tried to join a lonely hearts club, but they said „Hey, 
we‟re not that desperate‟” vs. “I tried to join a lonely hearts club, but they said „Hey, 
we‟re not that desperate‟”). In the control condition, the humor had no target (e.g., 
“He crossed a hyena with a parrot so it could tell him what it was laughing about” ). 
After observ ing one of the humorous v ideotapes, participants completed the fear of 
failure, conformity, and creativ ity tasks. 
 
Results. Analyses showed that participants who v iewed the other-ridiculing 
v ideotape exhibited more fear of failure than participants in the other two 
conditions. Specifically, in the ring toss task, participants who v iewed other-ridicule 
were more likely to stand either very close to the peg (indicating a lack of self -
challenge) or very far from the peg (indicating self-handicapping) than participants 
in the self-ridicule and control conditions, who did not differ and who stood a more 
moderate distance from the peg, indicating that they were realistically challenging 
themselves (Atkinson & Litwin, 1960). 
 
Participants in the other-ridicule condition also exhibited more conformity than 
participants in the other two conditions. Specifically, participants who v iewed other-
ridicule were more likely to match the bogus funniness ratings of the cartoons than 
were participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions, who did not differ.   
 
No differences between conditions were found, however, on the creativ ity task. 
Thus, other-ridicule did not impair creativ ity. 
 
Surprisingly (at least to us), on all three dependent measures, no significant 
differences emerged between the self-ridicule condition and the control condition. 
Thus, self-deprecating humor did not appear to have any disinhibiting effects on 
participants‟ behavior or thinking. 
 
Experiment 2 
 
The second experiment (Janes & Olson, 2000, Experiment 2) was designed to 
replicate Experiment 1 and to investigate a possible mediator of the obtained 
effects of other-ridicule. Our conceptual reasoning was that the effects of observ ing 
other people being ridiculed were caused by an increased salience of potential 
personal rejection; that is, observ ing another person being ridiculed increased the 
accessibility of the observer‟s thoughts about his or her own possible ridicule or 
Contrasting Effects of Ridicule 
                                                  
 
59 
rejection. We assessed this hypothesized salience of rejection using a lexical decision 
task. Participants had to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether a 
string of letters displayed on a computer screen comprised a word or a non-word. 
Forty trials involved real words: 10 acceptance-related words (e.g., accepted, 
approval), 10 rejection-related words (e.g., humiliated, mocked), and 20 neutral 
words. There were also 40 non-word filler trials. I f, indeed, observ ing other-ridicule 
increases the accessibility of rejection-related thoughts, then such participants 
should recognize rejection-related words more quickly (and perhaps acceptance-
related words more slowly) than participants in other conditions. 
 
Experiment 2 employed the same basic design as Experiment 1. Participants v iewed 
one of three 8-min v ideotapes and then completed the dependent measures. New 
versions of the v ideotapes, however, were developed for this second study. These 
v ideos were ostensibly designed to be educational v ideos—teaching observers how 
to change a bicycle tire. On these v ideos, an instructor and his assistant gave 
instructions regarding the lesson. In the self-ridicule condition, the instructor made 
several mistakes throughout the v ideo and expressed ridiculing comments about 
himself. In the other-ridicule condition, the instructor again made mistakes, but his 
assistant directed the ridiculing comments at the instructor. Thus, the ridiculing 
comments were identical in the two conditions, but they were delivered either by 
the instructor or by the assistant. For example, at one point in the lesson, the 
instructor pinched his finger in a pump while trying to inflate one of the bicycle‟s tires; 
he or the assistant then said “I  guess that‟s why they call it a foot pump!” In the 
control condition, no ridiculing comments were made by either person in the 
v ideotape. The dependent variables included the same measures of fear of failure 
and creativ ity that were used in Experiment 1, as well as the lexical decision task. The 
conformity measure was changed slightly: participants rated qualities of the 
v ideotape itself rather than funniness ratings of cartoons, but the logic of the 
measure was the same (i.e., inaccurate ratings by alleged “previous participants” 
were provided). 
 
Results. Replicating Experiment 1, the analyses showed that participants in the other-
ridicule condition exhibited greater fear of failure on the ring-toss task and greater 
conformity in the cartoon-rating task than did participants in the other two 
conditions, who did not differ from one another. Thus, again, the self-ridicule 
condition did not have a disinhibiting effect compared to the control condition. Also 
replicating the first study, no differences between any of the three conditions were 
found on the creativ ity measure.  
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Importantly, the lexical decision task also yielded significant differences between 
conditions. As predicted, participants in the other-ridicule condition recognized 
rejection-related words (relative to neutral words) significantly more quickly than did 
participants in the self-ridicule and control conditions, who did not differ. Thus, 
exposure to other-ridicule made thoughts of rejection more accessible. No 
differences between conditions were revealed in responses to the acceptance-
related words. We also conducted mediation analyses that tested whether thoughts 
about rejection mediated the effects of other-ridicule on fear of failure and 
conformity. These analyses indicated that the salience of rejection (as ev idenced by 
faster responses to rejection-related words than to neutral words) did, indeed, 
mediate the effect of other-ridicule on fear of failure; that is, when responses on the 
lexical decision task were controlled statistically, the other-ridicule condition did not 
differ from the remaining conditions in fear of failure. In contrast, the salience of 
rejection did not mediate the effect of other-ridicule on conformity. Perhaps our 
measure of conformity reflected a wish not to stand out, rather than fear of rejection 
per se. 
 
In sum, the results of the first two experiments supported our primary hypothesis that 
observ ing other people being ridiculed would have an inhibiting effect on the 
observer. In both experiments, participants in the other-ridicule condition exhibited 
more fear of failure and more conformity than participants in the self-ridicule and 
control conditions. Additionally, ev idence in Experiment 2 implicated the 
accessibility of thoughts about rejection as the psychological mediator of the 
differences in fear of failure.  
 
We think it is noteworthy that inhibiting effects  were obtained in response to the 
v ideotapes used in these studies, given the non-threatening nature of these stimulus 
materials. Participants observed other-ridicule v ia a stand-up comedian or an 
educational tape demonstrating how to change a bicycle tire. There was no 
possibility that participants would be ridiculed by these indiv iduals: the ridicule was 
pre-recorded, and participants did not expect to meet the depicted indiv iduals. I f 
these kinds of distant, non-threatening exposures to other-ridicule can produce jeer 
pressure, imagine what people must feel in real-life situations where they are 
exposed to actual ridicule and might, indeed, become a target of ridicule 
themselves (e.g., in the schoolyard or at social gatherings).  
 
Neither experiment found differences in creativ ity due to the humor stimuli. One 
possible explanation for these null results is that the Multiple Uses Task (Torrance, 
1962) has been criticized for relying excessively on verbal fluency as opposed to 
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creativ ity. Additionally, in both studies the creativ ity measure was assessed last, after 
the fear of failure and conformity measures. I t is possible that any effects had 
dissipated by the time the third dependent variable was assessed. In Experiment 3, 
we employed a different measure of creativ ity, and creativ ity was the sole variable 
we assessed. 
 
Also, neither experiment showed significant effects for self-deprecating humor 
compared to the control groups. That is, self-ridicule did not have its predicted 
disinhibiting effects, such as increasing indiv iduals‟ creativ ity. One possible 
explanation for these null results may be that the ridiculing jokes contained on the 
v ideotapes were too hostile or extreme, so when they were told as self-ridicule, they 
fell into the self-defeating category rather than the self-enhancing category (Martin 
et al., 2003). In the next experiment, we employed jokes that were gentler and more 
self-enhancing in nature, hoping that they might produce the predicted disinhibiting 
effect on observers. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
In a third experiment (Janes & Olson, 2009), only creativ ity was assessed. We focused 
on this variable because ridicule‟s effects on fear of failure and conformity had 
already been replicated in the prev ious studies. We expected that other -ridiculing 
humor would hinder creativ ity in participants, given the “inhibiting” effect that this 
ridicule had on participants in term of conformity and fear of failure. Moreover, some 
research suggests that environmental cues associated with danger activate in 
people a systematic, detail-oriented, risk-averse processing style, whereas a benign 
environment motivates a “risky processing style, in which internal knowledge 
structures serve to enrich the information at hand, thereby leading to more 
unconstrained creative thinking and a broad conceptual scope” (Kuschel, Förster, & 
Denzler, 2010, p. 4). I t seemed possible that observ ing ridicule of other people might 
be perceived as danger-related, whereas observing someone poking fun at 
themselves would produce a more benign environment (and, therefore, 
unconstrained creative thinking).  
 
In this study, participants were again exposed to one of three v ideotapes containing 
either self-ridicule, other ridicule, or no humor. Participants were led to believe that 
they were watching an instructional v ideotape offering a 10-min lesson on writing 
Haiku poetry (a highly stylized form of Japanese poetry) by a professor. As in the first 
two studies, the only difference between the conditions related to humor. In the self-
ridicule condition, the professor poked fun at himself (e.g., “My idea of roughing it is 
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getting poor serv ice at the Holiday Inn.”), whereas in the other-ridicule condition, the 
professor made fun of someone else (e.g., “His idea of roughing it is getting poor 
serv ice at the Holiday Inn.”). These ridiculing jokes/comments were selected to be 
less caustic and denigrating than in the prior studies. In the control condition, all 
humorous comments were omitted. 
 
Participants watched one of the three v ideos, ostensibly to learn how to write Haiku 
poetry, and were told that their comprehension of the material would be assessed. 
After watching the v ideotape, students reported their impressions of the instructor on 
a series of 7-point scales (e.g., “The instructor on the v ideotape seemed warm and 
friendly”). Next, participants completed a creativ ity task, Torrance‟s Test of Creative 
Thinking (1966), which involved using circles to make more elaborate objects. The 
validity of this test as a measure of creativ ity has been empirically supported (e.g., 
Torrance & Perbury, 1984; Torrance & Safter, 1989); scores reflect four dimensions of 
creativ ity: originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration. 
 
Results. Analyses revealed a main effect for humor condition on participants‟ 
creativ ity scores. As predicted, participants in the self-deprecating condition 
exhibited significantly higher levels of creativ ity on the task than did participants in 
the other-ridicule and no-ridicule conditions, which did not differ. Additionally, 
participants‟ perceptions of the instructor on the v ideotape were more positive in 
the self-ridicule condition than in the other two conditions, which again did not differ. 
Specifically, participants in the self-ridicule condition found the instructor to be 
significantly more “warm” than did participants in the other two conditions and 
expressed significantly higher levels of respect for the instructor than did participants 
in the other two conditions. 
 
To our knowledge, this study provides the first empirical ev idence that self-
deprecating humor can have positive, disinhibiting effects relative to a control 
condition; participants in the self-ridicule condition were more creative than 
participants in the other two conditions. Creativ ity requires divergent thinking—that 
is, approaching a task with an open and curious mind. I t makes sense that exposure 
to someone who pokes fun at his or her own weaknesses and foibles can produce 
greater openness and creativ ity. Presumably, self-deprecating humor generated a 
non-threatening atmosphere that allowed participants to be more “daring” in their  
thoughts about the task.  
 
There are at least three possible explanations for why the first two studies examining 
self-ridicule did not find any differences in creativ ity between conditions, whereas 
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Experiment 3 did. First, the dependent measure for creativ ity in Experiment 3 
(Torrance Test of Creativ ity) was arguably a better measure than the one used in the 
first two studies (Multiple Uses Task), which has been criticized for tapping verbal 
fluency rather than divergent thinking. Second, in Experiment 3, the creativ ity task 
was administered very soon after the v ideotape (with only the ratings of the 
instructor intervening); this procedure ensured that the effects of observ ing the 
humor had not dissipated by the time the participants performed the creativ ity task. 
Finally, the nature of the humor employed in the studies differed. In the first two 
studies, the self-deprecating humor (and the other-ridiculing humor) was quite 
caustic (e.g., “When I  was a kid, I  was so unpopular that my mother had to tie a pork 
chop around my neck just to get the dog to play with me”). In the third experiment, 
the ridicule was gentler and less dehumanizing (e.g., joking that someone‟s idea of 
roughing it is getting poor serv ice at the Holiday Inn). In this context, we should note 
that the gentler nature of the ridicule in Experiment 3 might also have contributed to 
the null result that participants in the other-ridicule condition were not creatively 
inhibited (although reduced creativ ity was also not obtained in the first two 
experiments). 
 
Another finding in Experiment 3 was that perceptions of the instructor in the self-
ridicule condition were more positive than those in the other conditions. The self-
deprecating instructor was perceived to be more “warm” than the instructors in the 
other two conditions, and participants had more respect for the self-deprecating 
instructor. The latter effect—greater respect for the self-deprecating instructor than 
for the other-ridiculing instructor—conflicts with early research examining perceptions 
of the instigators of ridicule. For example, in the research cited earlier by Stocking 
and Zillmann (1976), it was found that a male who disparaged himself was seen as 
having lower self-esteem, being less intelligent, and being less confident than a male 
who disparaged others—though only by male perceivers, not female perceivers. 
More recent research suggests that both men and women favor opposite-sex 
indiv iduals who generate self-deprecating as opposed to other deprecating humor 
for long-term relationships, prov iding they are high status (Greengross & Miller, 2008). 
Perhaps changes over the last three decades in norms and sex-role stereotypes 
have resulted in more favorable attitudes toward those who poke fun at themselves 
and less favorable attitudes toward those who ridicule other people among both 
men and women.   
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General Discussion 
 
Whereas much research has examined humor, very little has investigated the 
psychological and behavioral effects of observ ing different types of humor. To our 
knowledge, with one exception (Stocking & Zillmann, 1976), the present research is 
unique in that it contrasts other-deprecating and self-deprecating ridicule while 
holding the content of the jokes constant. This design makes it possible to ascertain 
that the target of ridicule, regardless of the content, is critical for how that ridicule 
affects observers.  
 
Our research documents two, contrasting effects of ridicule. First, observ ing ridicule 
of others has inhibiting effects—it motivates people to be “wary” in their behavior. 
The thought of being the target of ridicule oneself is aversive enough to inhibit 
people from standing out (e.g., they conform to the perceived opinions of others). 
Although this fear of ridicule can be employed in socially useful ways (e.g., the 
research described earlier on ridicule as an educational corrective), ridicule is often 
used for less socially desirable purposes. For example, school-aged children and 
teenagers are often subjected to ridicule for failing to conform to peers‟ standards of 
behavior. The student who refuses to take drugs or drink alcohol may be ridiculed, as 
may an indiv idual whose interests or clothes do not conform to those preferred by 
the peer group. 
 
Of course, these last examples involve the direct targets of ridicule, and our studies 
show that the effect of ridicule goes beyond the target. Our research shows that 
those who merely observe others being ridiculed are affected by it—even when they 
are in no danger of being the target of ridicule themselves. Witnessing another 
person being ridiculed leads observers to avoid behavior that might stand out; they 
choose, instead, to “play it safe”. The fear of being noticed and/or performing badly 
in front of others can result in missed opportunities (e.g., participants in Experiments 1 
and 2 did not realistically test themselves on the ring-toss task). 
 
Ridicule is not confined to the schoolyard by any means. Election campaigns seem 
to be increasingly characterized by ridicule and less by open discussion of the issues 
involved. An interesting, though unanswerable, question is how many competent 
and responsible indiv iduals have been deterred from seeking public office due to 
fear of personal ridicule. As Mark Twain noted, “There is no character, howsoever 
good and fine, but it can be destroyed by ridicule, howsoever poor and witless” 
(1893). 
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The second effect of ridicule documented in our research involves self-deprecating 
humor, which appears to have disinhibiting effects. With this type of humor, the 
indiv idual makes jokes about his or her own personal shortcomings. Often, self-
deprecating humor involves poking fun at those “absurdities and infirmities” that 
beset all of us. Our final study showed that merely observ ing self-deprecating humor 
can produce greater creativ ity—it seems to induce a readiness and/or ability to 
engage in more divergent thinking, presumably because people are more willing to 
risk generating ideas that might be perceived as bizarre or outlandish.  
 
Limitations 
 
There are some potential limitations to our research on the effects of both self - and 
other-directed ridicule that should be noted. The first limitation relates to indiv idual 
differences. I t is likely that there are traits that influence how people are affected by 
various types of humor. For example, indiv iduals‟ chronic humor styles may influence 
their responses to observ ing ridicule. An indiv idual who tends to use hostile humor in 
interpersonal settings may be less influenced by observ ing ridicule of others than an 
indiv idual who refrains from that type of humor, whereas an indiv idual who tends to 
use affiliative humor might be more disinhibited  by self-ridicule than an indiv idual 
who refrains from that type of humor. 
 
Additionally, the theme or topic of the humor may influence how people are 
affected by it. For example, observ ing other-directed ridicule that mocks 
characteristics that the observer feels he or she also possesses may have greater 
impact than ridicule mocking a characteristic that the observer considers personally 
irrelevant. Thus, an athletically-challenged indiv idual may be more inhibited by 
observ ing other-directed ridicule that targets another person‟s lack of athletic 
prowess than would a varsity athlete. The inhibiting effects of observ ing ridicule of 
others may be more potent when the observer feels potentially vulnerable as a 
target of the ridicule content. 
 
Concluding Comment 
 
The scientific study of humor is an important endeavor. Humor is one characteristic 
that distinguishes humankind from other species, and humor is ubiquitous in daily life. 
Humans laugh from an early age and, moreover, like to laugh. Humans do not, 
however, like to be laughed at. These conflicting responses account for the complex 
effects of ridicule. We hope that our work will contribute to a fuller understanding of 
the behavioral and psychological consequences of other-ridicule and self-ridicule. 
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